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Abstract: This study examines social networks and financial giving to charitable 
or religious causes. Conventional social capital measures of general social trust 
and size of social network are studied as predictors of charitable giving. To these 
traditional measures, we add an examination of particular network aspects of 
giving: ego giving in relation to network alters who give, solicitations to give by 
network ties, and ego soliciting alters to give. Additionally, the study 
disaggregates alter effects by alter position. Findings indicate that, net of social 
trust, social network factors significantly predict likelihood of being a giver. In 
particular, findings are that egos are especially likely to be donors when their 
primary alter donates. Three configurations of ego-alter giving and solicitations 
are significant predictors of ego giving, indicating that ego-alter doing matters 
more than asking. Theoretical contributions for relational and prosocial studies 
are discussed, as are practical implications for fundraising professionals. 
Keywords: charitable giving, social networks, social capital, social theory, altruism 
Charitable giving by individuals is an important social phenomenon that is to date 
understudied by sociologists. Giving USA (2015) estimates that giving to charitable sources 
amounts to nearly $316 billion and accounts for nearly two-thirds of all charitable 
contributions—including those from foundations, bequests, and corporations. The largest 
proportion of the total, 72 percent and $229 billion, is given by individuals. The average amount 
of money that individuals donate to charity each year has generally risen over time. Despite 
recent recession setbacks and adjusting for inflation, individual contributions today far exceed 
what they were 30 years ago. Thus, individual charitable contributions are an increasingly 
significant aspect of social life that deserves sociological investigation. 
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What explains charitable giving by individuals? A plethora of literature on charitable 
giving exists within fields related to economics and, to a lesser extent, psychology. Given the 
rational actor understanding of charitable giving that is typical to these areas, the persistent 
puzzle is why people act against their own self-interest to benefit others (Wang & Graddy, 
2008). The available social psychological explanations tend to focus on internal motivations, or 
external and situational factors, or a combination of those (Simpson & Willer, 2015). However, 
scholars find that there is heterogeneity in social psychological predictors of prosocial behaviors 
(Simpson & Willer, 2008), raising questions about their explanations.  
Sociology furnishes many insights on prosocial action, but under divergent theoretical 
expectations. Both Simmel (Simmel, 1964; Pescosolido & Rubin, 2000) and Durkheim (1915) 
posit that network influence and social solidarity are key forces in social actions, particularly 
those oriented toward altruistic and moral ends. However, Durkheim saw social solidarity as 
declining in modernity due to social differentiation, while Simmel—especially as interpreted by 
Fischer (1995)—saw modern people as still embedded in webs of affiliation. This should raise 
curiosity around the empirical case of charitable giving as a way to adjudicate between the 
Durkheimian, individualistic expectation that social relations are now unlikely to predict 
individual behavior, such as charitable giving, or the Simmelian relational expectation that 
affiliations remain an important predictor of behavior. Mounting empirical evidence confirms 
theoretical expectations that social factors help to differentiate giving behaviors (Putnam et al., 
2012; Lim & MacGregor, 2012; Bekkers & Weipking, 2011a; 2011b; Lim & Putnam, 2010; 
Brooks, 2005). Despite these advancements, it remains understudied which particular aspects of 
social networks matter in charitable giving.  
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 This study investigates charitable giving through a disaggregated social capital approach 
that focuses on social affiliations via egocentric networks. A contribution of the study is the 
disaggregation of network effects by alter position. Another novel contribution is an 
investigation of ego-alter network configurations, namely whether ego and alter are givers, 
whether ego asks alter to give, whether alter asks ego to give, and their combinations. We 
undertake these approaches to investigate the primary research question of this study: Which 
specific aspects of social capital differentiate who donates money to charitable causes? We also 
ask: What role do social network ties have in distinguishing who is a giver and who is not? 
Social Networks and Charitable Giving 
 In explaining prosocial behaviors, scholars are increasingly moving beyond purely 
economic, rational actor explanations for charitable giving, and generally findings indicate that 
socio-relational factors partially account for actions oriented toward improving the collective 
good (Forbes & Zampelli, 2011). Among the most notorious of such studies are those about 
social capital (e.g. Putnam, 2000), with findings that having higher levels of social capital relates 
to greater prosocial behaviors, such as philanthropy (Brown & Ferris, 2007), volunteering 
(Taniguchi & Marshall, 2014; Musick et al., 2000), religious participation (Putnam et al., 2012), 
and online giving (Reddick & Ponomariov, 2013).  
Social networks have attracted burgeoning attention, and there has been a notable 
increase in social network findings in numerous subfields and disciplines (Rivera et al., 2010; 
Glanville et al., 2013). Likewise, many scholars have recently investigated the general role of 
social networks in predicting prosocial behaviors, such as altruism, cooperation (Simpson & 
Willer, 2015), volunteering (Paik & Navarre-Jackson, 2011), political participation (Yen & 
Zampelli, 2014), and charitable giving (Lewis et al., 2013). These include studies of number of 
4 
friends (Curry & Dunbar, 2011), kinship support and the expectation for reciprocal altruism 
(Curry et al., 2013), family member influence to volunteer (Nesbit, 2013), religious participation 
(Lewis et al., 2013), and recruitment (Merino, 2014).  
However, with a few notable exceptions (Castillo et al., 2014; Saxton & Wang, 2013; 
Hustinx et al., 2012; Ostrander, 2007), the role of social networks in the specific social capital 
outcome of financial giving is understudied. Yet, there is mounting evidence that social networks 
are key in understanding charitable giving. For example, Cook (2005) finds that social networks 
underlie the ways in which people mobilize resources for cooperation. When investigating social 
trust and social networks in the same study, scholars find social networks to be a major factor 
predicting charitable behaviors (Wang & Graddy, 2008). Considering evidence that various 
expressions of social capital may be distinct in their predictors (Hustinx et al., 2012), the link 
between social capital and financial giving specifically warrants investigation. Yet a number of 
unanswered questions remain with regard to applying a contemporary understanding of social 
capital. What is missing is a nuanced study that investigates which particular features of social 
networks are significant predictors of charitable giving. This study thus advances prior efforts 
Hypotheses 
Based on extant studies, our first two hypotheses highlight conventional aspects of social 
capital: social trust and network size (Putnam, 2000; Curry & Dunbar, 2011). We investigate in 
the first hypothesis the expectation that more trust is related to greater likelihood of being a 
charitable giver (e.g. Glanville et al. 2013; Taniguchi and Marshall 2014). Thus, we formulate 
Hypothesis 1: Social trust positively predicts likelihood of charitable giving. We also investigate 
the expectation that greater social network size, net of trust, will relate to greater likelihood of 
being a charitable giver. Thus, we formulate Hypothesis 2: Social network size positively 
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predicts likelihood of charitable giving. In addition to using these two general measures of social 
capital, we investigate networks in greater detail by studying which features of networks matter.  
 Studies indicate that social networks influence giving because they expose people to 
“doing” behavior (e.g. Frey & Meier, 2004). Information on the actions of others can invoke 
social comparison that becomes a reference in making decisions about one’s own actions 
(Andreoni & Petrie, 2004). For example, research participants in an experiment gave the greatest 
charitable contribution when the other research participants were identified and their giving 
amounts were reported. The theory is that social comparison overcomes the “free rider problem,” 
which is that people have a tendency to relay on the actions of others unless information triggers 
their needing to have a personal role. In another study, information on the giving contributions of 
others increased contributions by 12 percent (Shang & Croson, 2009). Based on these studies, we 
expect that people with alters who give to charitable causes are more likely to give. We 
formulate Hypothesis 3: Network “doing” positively predicts likelihood of charitable giving.  
 Our fourth hypothesis is based on other studies that investigate the role of solicitations to 
give, or “asks,” by alters (e.g. Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011a). For example, one study found that 
people with more extended networks and higher education give more, but that this is mediated by 
requests for donations, along with financial resources, church attendance, and prosocial 
personality characteristics (Wiepking & Maas, 2009). Another, on volunteering, found that 
prosocial activities were higher when recruitment was greater (Paik & Navarre-Jackson, 2011). 
A third study found the likelihood of giving is 10 times higher and donation size 52 percent 
larger when friends ask for donations (Castillo et al., 2014). One theory for why this relationship 
exists is peer pressure, that desire to present as a generous person and compels giving (Meer, 
2011). Another theory is that giving is part of social support generally, and that people are likely 
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to act generously when compelled to support their network through being asked (Merino, 2014). 
In both theories, the observable result is the same: network asking is linked to greater giving. 
Based on this vein of studies, we formulate Hypothesis 4: Network “asking” positively predicts 
likelihood of charitable giving.  
Methodology 
Data. To test these hypotheses, we employ data from the 2010 Science of Generosity 
Survey, a national survey of Americans ages 23 and older who live in U.S. households (Smith et 
al., 2010). The sample used for the survey is a probability-based, online, non-volunteer access 
panel sample drawn using a dual-frame sampling method that was partly recruited through an 
address-based sample method and partly by telephone using random-digit-dialing (RDD) 
methods. This dual-sampling frame captures cell phone–only households as well as households 
without internet access and Spanish-speaking households. The combination of address-based 
sampling (ABS) and telephone random-digit-dial (RDD) methods accounts for about 99 percent 
of the U.S. population. Households without computers were provided with laptops and 
immediate internet access. Respondents received token incentives in order to ensure greater 
representation across the socioeconomic spectrum. The sample was randomly selected for the 
survey using an implicitly stratified systematic sample designed to be a nationally representative 
sample of respondents. A final sample size of 1,997 was achieved for the survey, with a 66 
percent participation rate. Population characteristics are compared to benchmark datasets and 
reflect limited differences between the general U.S. population and the study sample. Statistical 
weights are employed to adjust for sampling and population representation. Thus, the weighted 
survey data represent a nationally representative sample of Americans ages 23 and older.  
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Measures. The outcome measure is a binary variable representing whether respondent 
gave to charitable causes in the past year. To investigate Hypothesis 1, that social trust is related 
to giving, a seven-point strongly dis/agree scale is used for the statement “Generally speaking, 
most people can be trusted.” The survey produced ego-centric network data by asking, “In the 
last 12 months, how many adults have you felt close to, including a spouse or romantic partner, 
adult children, or other adult family members, friends, neighbors, coworkers, or people involved 
in groups or organizations that you are involved in?” Respondents (“egos”) could nominate zero 
to four, or select five or more, representing the number of network ties and a test of Hypothesis 2.  
For each of the social ties named (“alters”), the survey asked an array of questions. 
Respondents were asked whether each alter gives money to charitable causes, indicating social 
network “doing,” labeled as Network Gives, and providing a test of Hypothesis 3. Given the 
consistent evidence that social networks influence social outcomes through exposing individuals 
to others’ behavior and thus establishing normative expectations, we investigate social network 
doing as an exposure effect which is a binary outcome of any alter in the network exposing ego 
to giving. We also investigate the possibility that the position of alters may matter in network 
dynamics (Fowler & Christakis, 2010) by disaggregating alter position in studying whether Alter 
1, Alter 2, Alter 3, Alter 4, and Alter 5 each gives to charitable or religious causes. 
Hypothesis 4 is tested by a measure of whether each alter had ever asked the respondent 
to give, labeled as Network Asks. We again examine this as exposure to any social network 
member soliciting the ego to give, and as a positional effect of each alter asking ego to give. 
Respondents were also asked if they had ever asked each alter to give, labeled as Network Asked. 
These data also allow an operationalization of ego-alter giving combinations: whether the alter 
gives, asks ego to give, or has been asked by ego to give can vary in tandem. Together these 
8 
three measures give rise to eight possible scenarios, which are listed in Table 5, and which we 
investigate in their relation to ego giving. We also investigate a number of potential covariates, 
including age (Lewis et al., 2013; Merino, 2013; Wiepking & Maas, 2009), religious 
participation (Cnaan & Curtis, 2013; Wiepking & James, 2013; Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008), 
political affiliation (Putnam et al., 2012), income (Wiepking & Maas, 2009), education, 
homeownership, marital status, employment status, gender, and race (Bekkers & Weipking, 
2011a; 2011b). We include the alter covariates of age, marital status (Aral & Walker, 2012), 
gender (Einolf, 2011), and education (Gesthuizen & Scheepers, 2012). 
Analysis. Statistical modeling is computed using STATA 14 survey commands 
(O’Donnell et al., 2008). Measures included in each model are tested for multicolinearity, with 
maximum variance inflation factor below three and tolerance above 0.50. Regression diagnostics 
are computed post-estimation to test model specification and Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
(Fagerland & Hosmer, 2012). Nested models are tested using Wald tests. Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics for all measures. Logistic regression analyses predicting the binary outcome 
of giving or not giving are presented in Tables 2-5. In Table 2 models, there are 20 cases missing 
for one of the independent measures (1 percent) that were listwise deleted, resulting in a sample 
size of 1,977. There were 137 cases (6.9 percent of the sample) that answered that they have zero 
people to whom they feel close. Since these respondents do not have a social network grid, they 
are excluded from Model 4 in Table 2 onward, resulting in a sample size of 1,840. Table 4 
examines alter positions and restricts to the 1,208 cases (60.5 percent) who enumerated five 
alters, of which 16 cases were missing on the independent, resulting in a sample size of 1,192.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
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 Limitations. Despite the strengths of our approach, this study also has some limitations. 
First, all results report social network factors as related to whether ego is a giver, not amounts of 
money donated. Second, our findings rely on self-reported survey data susceptible to potential 
respondent errors (Paik & Sanchagrin, 2013), though this study limited these issues by reducing 
fatigue via an online, skip-pattern survey. Third, endogeneity of social network influences with 
the charitable giving outcome is a possibility. To assess and limit this issue, we considered three 
possible sources of endogeneity: omitted variables, self-selection, and simultaneity. In 
investigating the possibility of an omitted variable, we conducted additional analyses that 
included measures for: Alter 1 is a source of emotional support for ego; Alter 1 discusses with 
ego social or political issues; Alter 1 agrees with ego on social and political issues; Alter 1 is 
religious; Alter 1 is close in age to ego; and the number of years that ego has known Alter 1. 
None of these were statistically significant, and their inclusion failed the nested model test.  
We additionally considered self-selection effects in the homophily of social networks, 
which we conceive of theoretically as considering whether “birds of a similar feather flock 
together” or rather that “birds in similar weather grow a similar feather.” The most direct 
investigation of this possibility would be to include in the survey a measure for the duration that 
ego and alters have known each other, along with a duration that ego has been giving, and ideally 
even duration that alters have been giving. In the current dataset, only duration of ego-alter 
relationship exists, and thus we recommend this as a topic for future studies. We were able with 
this dataset to investigate proxy measures for alter ties. Specifically, we analyzed Model 1 of 
Table 4 with three alter type categories: ties that likely pre-date adult giving behaviors (parents 
and other family members; Wilhelm et al., 2008); spouses (Herzog & Price, 2016); and ties that 
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likely are concurrent to or post-date giving (neighbors and all other non-family, non-spousal ties; 
Putnam 2000; Putnam et al. 2012; McPherson et al. 2011).  
Employing family ties as the reference group, we find that the alter giving correlation 
remains statistically significant, that there is no statistically significant difference for spouse and 
non-family alters (as compared to parent and family alters), and that the model fails nested model 
test. We do find that there are differences of interest, however, for Model 1 in Table 5. By 
including the alter types in the model, we find that the mutual asking scenario remains 
statistically significant for family alters, but is not statistically significant for spouses or alters 
who are not family (neighbors and others). This implies that in family relationships when both 
ego and alter ask each other to give, ego is more likely to be a giver. Though these are not 
longitudinal data, there is a high likelihood that in non-spousal family ties ego learned this 
behavior from alter.  
 There are remaining ambiguities in these proxies regarding the timing of tie formation, 
especially given increasing family fluidity among younger generations (Cherlin 2014). However, 
for the purposes of this analysis we assume for now that newer family ties would likely not be 
among the top five of alters nominated, and we also suggest future studies investigate this 
empirically. In the interim, we offer a step forward in assessing the possible direction of 
influence. Moreover, a third possible source of endogeneity, simultaneity, requires longitudinal 
data that is coupled with similar social network measures, to investigate social networks as 
dynamic and mutually influencing over time. Nevertheless, this study contributes important 
insights in studying social networks and giving. 
Results 
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 Social Trust and Network Size. We first examine potential relationships of individual 
charitable giving with general social trust and social network size. Table 2 presents findings from 
the first four models. Model 1 in this table predicts the likelihood of being a giver by including 
typical demographic and social status measures as covariates. Model 1 shows that annual 
household income is highly statistically significant (at the p<0.001 level) and positively related 
to being a giver, with the odds of being a giver increasing by 1.09 for each unit increase in 
income (about every $5,000). Also statistically significant are gender, age, educational 
attainment, political party, and religious service attendance. The odds of being a giver are 1.38 
for females, as compared to men, and the odds of being a giver increase by 1.01 for each year of 
age. The odds of someone with a college degree being a giver are 1.58 greater than for without a 
college degree. A Democrat has 1.62 greater odds of being a giver, as compared to no political 
party affiliation. Those attending religious services weekly or more have 1.47 greater odds of 
being a giver than those who never attend. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 Model 2 in Table 2 tests Hypothesis 1 that, net of the aforementioned covariates, social 
trust positively predicts likelihood of being a giver (the same model represents the baseline 
model for all subsequent tables). The results support Hypothesis 1 and show that generalized 
social trust is statistically significantly related to being a charitable giver, with the odds of being 
a giver increasing by 1.10 for each unit increase in the level of social trust. Yet the nested model 
Wald test shows that Model 2 is only slightly statistically significantly (p<0.05) distinct from 
Model 1, implying that social trust’s contribution to giving is minimal.  
 Model 3 adds social network size to test Hypothesis 2. Findings indicate that network 
size is statistically significantly and positively related to being a giver; the odds of giving 
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increase by 1.19 for each friend listed in the egocentric network. This provides initial support for 
Hypothesis 2. The nested model Wald test shows that Model 3 is statistically significantly 
(p<0.0001) distinct from Model 2, with a significant contribution gained from adding social 
networks to the model. However, it remains unclear whether it is social network size or simply 
whether one has a social network that matters, a question we investigate in Models 3 (network 
size) and 4 (having a network). Model 4 presents the previous model restricted to the respondents 
who listed at least one friend in their social network (n=1,840). The fact that the statistical 
significance of the network size measure is lost with this constriction indicates that it is not the 
relative size of the social network, but rather whether one has a social network at all that predicts 
being a giver. Thus, while we find initial support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, Table 2 shows that 
further investigation is needed into particular aspects of network ties. 
 Network Doing and Asking. Table 3 presents the results of the sample in Model 4 of 
Table 2, those respondents who named at least one person to whom they feel close. All the same 
covariates of Table 2 are included in subsequent models, but only statistically significant 
predictors are shown in the table. In Table 3, Model 1 includes whether an ego has a social 
network tie who gives to charitable causes (Giving in Social Network—Hypothesis 3: Giving 
“Doing”), while Model 2 analyzes whether an ego has been asked by a social tie to give money 
to charity (Asked by Social Network to Give—Hypothesis 4: Giving “Asking”). Model 3 includes 
whether ego asked any of their social network ties to donate to charitable causes (Asks Social 
Network to Give—Giving “Asks”). Model 4 tests all three measures (Giving, Asked, and Asks).  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Findings indicate that the same covariates retain statistical significance, with the one 
exception that white respondents, as compared to black respondents and net of having at least 
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one social tie, are statistically significantly more likely to give to charitable causes. Model 1 
shows that Americans with at least one giver in their network are statistically significantly more 
likely to be givers, with an odds ratio 1.86 greater than those without a giver in their network. 
This result provides initial support for Hypothesis 3. Support is also found for Hypothesis 4. 
Americans with a social network tie who asked them to give to charitable causes (Model 2) are 
also statistically significantly more likely to be givers, with 1.71 greater odds than those without 
an asker in their network. Model 3 shows that Americans who asked someone in their social 
network to give to causes have 1.57 greater odds of being a giver than those who did not.  
 In the final model of Table 3, Model 4 analyzes all three of these measures 
simultaneously. It confirms that, on average, Americans with givers in their network are more 
likely to give than those without. Notably, once all three giving network measures are included—
giving in network, asked to give by network, and ask network to give—the only measure that 
retains statistical significance is the first: those exposed to a giver have an odds ratio of 1.64 
greater likelihood of someone without a giver in their network. Likewise, estimating the models 
as nested with each social network measure added sequentially returned statistically significant 
results only for Models 1 and 4, evidencing nil contribution of the asked and asks measures. 
Thus, Table 3 provides evidence that most supports Hypothesis 3, that exposure to giving within 
social networks is related to greater likelihood of being a giver. At the level of the social network 
as a whole, it appears that it is exposure to givers, not necessarily solicitations or asking network 
members to give, that relates to greater odds of being a giver.  
 Network Exposure and Position. In Table 4, the models follow a similar structure to the 
previous set, with the central difference that each alter is entered in the model individually, 
instead of being combined into an overall social network. The same measures are analyzed, but 
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they are specifically related to each alter position. All prior covariates are included, and only 
those with statistical significance are displayed in Table 4. Most covariate significance remains 
the same, with some exceptions explained below. Model 1 of Table 4 again focuses on Alter 1, 
which is statistically significantly related to a greater likelihood of ego giving. When Alter 1 
gives, ego has 1.54 greater odds of giving than if Alter 1 is not a giver. None of the other alter 
positions are statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
In Model 2, a similar effect is found for being asked to give, namely that Alter 1 is the 
only statistically significant predictor among the five alter positions. When Alter 1 asks ego to 
give, the odds are 1.68 greater that ego is a giver than when Alter 1 does not. In Model 3, a 
different pattern emerges: Alter 1 does not have a statistically significant relationship to ego 
giving. Instead, it is Alter 3 that is significant. However, in this case, it appears that asking Alter 
3 to give decreases the odds that ego is a giver by half. Thus, more evidence is found to support 
network cascades in giving behavior, through the position of alters relating to ego giving. 
Likewise, Wald tests of nested models by alter position indicate that only the model with Alter 1 
measures included is statistically significantly (p<0.05) distinct from the baseline model. A 
single model with all the alters fails the nested model test, and other robustness checks of the 
Alter 3 finding failed. Therefore, the primary alter position (Alter 1) is the only one that 
consistently and robustly relates to ego giving. 
Model 4 thus examines the likelihood of being a giver when only Alter 1 giving 
characteristics are included in the model. Specifically, Model 4 investigates ego covariates and 
Alter 1 Gives, Alter 1 Asked (alter asked ego to give), and Alter 1 Asks (ego asks alter to give) 
in predicting likelihood that ego is a giver to charitable causes. This model shows that, on 
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average and net of covariates, Americans whose primary network tie is a giver have 1.45 greater 
odds of being a giver than those whose primary network tie is not a giver. Of note is that asked 
and asks are not statistically significant net of Alter 1 gives. Also, ego being female and older 
become statistically significant predictors once alter giving is controlled, while the statistical 
significance of being a political independent and having greater social trust is eliminated with 
inclusion of alter giving factors. The findings of Model 4 provide further support for Hypothesis 
3, and further, they identify that it is giving behavior by primary alters that relates to ego giving. 
 Doing-Asking Combinations. The final set of analyses is presented in Table 5. All 
covariates of the baseline model (Table 2, Model 2) are included, and only statistically 
significant predictors are displayed. This set of models examines combinations of alter giving 
and ego-alter asking. The eight possible scenarios are: (1) alter gives and mutual asking, (2) alter 
gives and alter asks, (3) alter gives and ego asks, (4) alter gives and no asking, (5) non-giving 
alter and mutual asking, (6) non-giving alter and alter asks, (7) non-giving alter and ego asks, 
and (8) non-giving alter and no asking (reference category). The eighth scenario (non-giving 
alter and no asking) is the reference category and represents the largest group: 47.61 percent. 
Table 5 displays the results. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 Model 1 in Table 5 displays the results of including eight scenarios with all previous 
covariates and finds that those with an Alter 1 in any of three scenarios are statistically 
significantly more likely to be givers than those whose alter is in Scenario 8. These are: Scenario 
1: Alter Gives and Mutual Asking; Scenario 2: Alter Gives and Alter Asks; and Scenario 4: Alter 
Gives and No Asking. Of these, Scenario 2: Alter Gives and Alter Asks has the greatest 
likelihood of ego being a giver, with 2.52 greater odds of being a giver, as compared to the 
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reference category. Scenario 1: Alter Gives and Mutual Asking has the second largest odds ratio, 
with 2.02 greater odds of being a giver, compared to the reference category. Of the three 
statistically significant scenarios, the most common occurrence is Scenario 4: Alter Gives and 
No Asking, yet it has the lowest odds ratio for ego being a giver: with odds of being a giver as 
1.88 greater than for Americans with no network giving dynamics, as compared to reference. We 
thus find further evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, and for a nuanced version of Hypothesis 4.  
Discussion and Implications 
This study contributes to a better understanding of individual charitable activity choices. 
Specifically, we examined how one’s close relations regarding charitable giving influence one’s 
own donative behavior. Beyond social trust alone, we find that social network factors 
differentiate who gives to charitable and religious causes. In answering calls by scholars such as 
Curry and Dunbar (2011) for investigations into specific features of social networks, we focus in 
particular on size, alter position, exposure to giving behaviors within networks, solicitations to 
give by network ties, ego and alter behavioral pairings, and mechanisms of social network effects 
via relational characteristics. We find that alters can have an impact on ego’s choice to give. 
Based on the insights of Fowler and Christakis (2010), we investigated positions of alters and 
find that the impact is not uniform across all alters.  
Only the donation behavior of the person listed in the first alter position consistently and 
robustly related to greater likelihood that ego engages in philanthropic giving. We additionally 
conclude that social network “doing” and “asking” are both important social network features. 
Both having a giver and an asker in one’s social network increase the likelihood that one 
participates in charitable giving. When analyzing both simultaneously, we find that having a 
giver in the set of alters has a larger impact than network asking. We also find that the 
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configuration of ego-alter asking and giving matters. Individual charitable giving is related to 
three configurations: mutual doing and mutual asking, mutual doing and alter asking, and mutual 
doing without either asking. These findings have implications for scholarship on philanthropy, as 
well as for practitioners in the fundraising industry.  
 Contributions to Scholarship. This study underscores recent and developing theories on 
the significance of relations in altruistic and prosocial behaviors (e.g. Simpson & Willer, 2015). 
One theoretical contribution is its investigation into complex constellations of relational 
configurations. We provide an empirical instantiation of the theories by Donati and Archer 
(2015), who argue that epistemology is necessarily dependent upon relational understandings of 
social occurrences. While symbolic interactionism has long emphasized the social process 
behind perception and meaning-making (Mead, 1934), this newer articulation of the social 
interdependency of meaning-making highlights both micro, meso, and macro-level interactions, 
which are engrained in the social structure via features such as social networks. The evidence 
here is that givers are embedded in social structural relations: more tied to givers and askers. 
More generally, these findings challenge a purely agentic, rational choice theory and a 
purely situational theory of social action: in social networks, micro-level agency interacts in 
complex ways with macro-level social structures. We apply a Simmelian notion of webs of 
affiliation (Pescosolido & Rubin, 2000; Simmel, 1964) to extend and, in certain ways, contradict 
Durkheimian notions of altruism, social solidarity, and morality (Durkheim, 1915). This study 
highlights the continued relevance of Durkheim’s notion of individuals as performing self-costly 
behaviors, such as giving away their monetary resources to nonprofit and religious organizations, 
in order to sustain and promote social goods, such as the strength of their interpersonal 
relationships. Yet the study also provides counter-evidence to Durkheim’s claim that modernity 
18 
brought continual decline in social forces (Tole, 1993), resulting in a rising sense of 
individualism (e.g Bellah et al., 1985), because it evidences a continued social patterning. 
 Contributions to Practice. This study also has a number of practical implications and 
could be employed to leverage further donations by using relations of one donor to seek 
donations from their network. For example, we discovered that Alter 1 is primary, which 
supports existing findings (Rivera e al., 2010) on the importance of dyadic relationships. We also 
contribute additional support for social networks as part of explaining religious giving, insofar as 
religious people may give with greater frequency because of being exposed to more observations 
of giving, and solicitations, in their network (Wiepking & Maas, 2009; Lewis et al., 2013; Lim & 
MacGregor, 2012), although that may be in decline (Taylor, 2014). Moreover, our findings have 
relevance for research-based philanthropy: targeting individuals may not be as effective as 
strategies that seek to increase giving through network ties. 
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Table 1. Weighted Descriptive Statistics (N=1,977) 
 Mean / Prop. SD Min. Max. 
Charitable Giver (Outcome)  0.552 0.497 0 1 
Covariate Measures     
 Female 0.512 0.500 0 1 
 Age 48.69 15.55 23 102 
 Race/Ethnicity     
   White 0.700 0.458 0 1 
    Black (REF) 0.107 0.309 0 1 
    Hispanic 0.128 0.334 0 1 
    Other 0.065 0.246 0 1 
 Married 0.636 0.481 0 1 
 Youth in Household 0.303 0.460 0 1 
 Homeowner 0.744 0.437 0 1 
 Employed 0.565 0.496 0 1 
 Household Income  11.14 4.370 1 19 
 College Degree 0.371 0.483 0 1 
 Religious Service Frequency     
    Never (REF) 0.345 0.476 0 1 
    Yearly 0.302 0.459 0 1 
    Monthly 0.088 0.283 0 1 
    Weekly+ 0.263 0.440 0 1 
 Political Party Affiliation     
     Republican 0.253 0.435 0 1 
     Democrat 0.348 0.477 0 1 
     Independent 0.194 0.395 0 1 
     No Political Party Affiliation (REF) 0.205 0.404 0 1 
 Metropolitan Area Residence 0.831 0.375 0 1 
Social Capital & Social Network Measures     
 Social Trust 4.135 1.530 1 7 
 Social Network Size 3.763 1.724 0 5 
 Giver in Social Network 0.640 0.480 0 1 
 Asked by Social Network 0.318 0.466 0 1 
 Asks of Social Network 0.275 0.446 0 1 
 Alter 1 0.916 0.278 0 1 
 Alter 2 0.909 0.287 0 1 
 Alter 3 0.900 0.300 0 1 
 Alter 4 0.887 0.316 0 1 
 Alter 5 0.875 0.331 0 1 
 Alter 1 – Giver 0.424 0.494 0 1 
 Alter 1 – Asked 0.195 0.396 0 1 
 Alter 1 – Asks  0.192 0.394 0 1 
Source: Science of Generosity Survey 2010 
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Table 2. Logistic Regression of Charitable Giving, Unstandardized Coefficients 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Female 0.319* 0.332* 0.236 0.330* 
[Reference: Female] (0.138) (0.138) (0.141) (0.148) 
Age 0.0147** 0.0134** 0.0101 0.0114* 
 (0.00508) (0.00517) (0.00516) (0.00529) 
Race-White 0.385 0.325 0.335 0.372 
[Reference: Black] (0.249) (0.247) (0.251) (0.260) 
Race-Hispanic -0.0221 -0.0824 -0.0446 0.0298 
 (0.302) (0.298) (0.299) (0.313) 
Race-Other -0.282 -0.342 -0.347 -0.291 
 (0.389) (0.392) (0.397) (0.414) 
Married 0.110 0.117 0.108 0.136 
 (0.160) (0.161) (0.163) (0.172) 
Youth in Household 0.238 0.253 0.263 0.255 
 (0.178) (0.179) (0.183) (0.189) 
Homeowner 0.189 0.174 0.183 0.231 
 (0.170) (0.170) (0.172) (0.178) 
Employed 0.0296 0.0135 0.0184 0.0845 
 (0.156) (0.157) (0.159) (0.165) 
Household Income 0.0859*** 0.0836*** 0.0758*** 0.0810*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0210) 
College Degree 0.459** 0.452** 0.415** 0.391* 
 (0.153) (0.154) (0.155) (0.161) 
Religious Services – Yearly  0.301 0.289 0.271 0.197 
[Reference: Never] (0.174) (0.175) (0.179) (0.183) 
Religious Services – Monthly  -0.129 -0.139 -0.159 -0.135 
   (0.255) (0.256) (0.257) (0.267) 
Religious Services – Weekly+ 0.384* 0.362* 0.286 0.297 
   (0.181) (0.181) (0.182) (0.191) 
Political Party-Republican  0.289 0.283 0.287 0.268 
[Reference: No Affiliation] (0.211) (0.212) (0.217) (0.220) 
Political Party-Democrat 0.482* 0.449* 0.414* 0.430* 
 (0.198) (0.198) (0.202) (0.209) 
Political Party-Independent 0.398 0.389 0.374 0.398 
 (0.209) (0.209) (0.213) (0.222) 
Metropolitan Area Residence 0.183 0.207 0.217 0.309 
 (0.191) (0.191) (0.195) (0.196) 
Social Trust  0.0950* 0.0741 0.0750 
  (0.0472) (0.0490) (0.0503) 
Social Network Size (0-5+)   0.170*** 0.0986 
   (0.0438) (0.0554) 
Constant -2.974*** -3.212*** -3.607*** -3.573*** 
 (0.448) (0.460) (0.490) (0.529) 
Observations 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,840 
Source: Science of Generosity Survey 2010 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
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Table 3. Logistic Regression of Charitable Giving & Social Network Exposure to 
Charitable Giving, Being Asked to Give, or Asking Others to Give to Charitable Causes 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Female 0.348* 0.378** 0.359* 0.350* 
 (0.148) (0.145) (0.145) (0.148) 
Age 0.0134* 0.0126* 0.0132* 0.0130* 
 (0.00533) (0.00543) (0.00536) (0.00545) 
Household Income 0.0808*** 0.0857*** 0.0843*** 0.0816*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0211) 
College Degree 0.358* 0.387* 0.388* 0.364* 
 (0.163) (0.161) (0.160) (0.162) 
Political Party-Democrat 0.422* 0.443* 0.431* 0.428* 
 (0.211) (0.208) (0.209) (0.211) 
Social Trust 0.422* 0.443* 0.431* 0.428* 
 (0.211) (0.208) (0.209) (0.211) 
Giving in Social Network 0.619***   0.493** 
 (0.153)   (0.168) 
Asked by Social Network to Give  0.537**  0.289 
  (0.166)  (0.205) 
Asks Social Network to Give   0.453** 0.124 
   (0.166) (0.202) 
Constant -3.367*** -3.342*** -3.300*** -3.398*** 
 (0.490) (0.498) (0.491) (0.496) 
Observations 1,840 1,840 1,840 1,840 
Source: Science of Generosity Survey 2010 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; only significant measures shown. 
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Table 4. Logistic Regression of Charitable Giving & Social Network Alters  
Statistically Significant Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Household Income 0.0723** 0.0792** 0.0808** 0.0826*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0210) 
College Degree 0.506* 0.560** 0.536* 0.364* 
 (0.211) (0.210) (0.210) (0.160) 
Political Party-Democrat 0.576* 0.560* 0.568* 0.455* 
 (0.261) (0.262) (0.267) (0.208) 
Political Party-Independent 0.558* 0.587* 0.593* 0.349 
 (0.284) (0.280) (0.285) (0.220) 
Social Trust 0.156* 0.145* 0.144* 0.0767 
 (0.0644) (0.0641) (0.0628) (0.0497) 
Alter 1 - Gives 0.433*   0.374* 
 (0.217)   (0.165) 
Alter 1 – Asked   0.520*  0.334 
  (0.250)  (0.232) 
Alter 3 – Asks    -0.692*  
   (0.351)  
Constant -3.371*** -3.473*** -3.393***  
 (0.641) (0.669) (0.649)  
Observations 1,192 1,192 1,192  
Source: Science of Generosity 2010 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Only significant measures shown. 
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Table 5. Logistic Regression of Charitable Giving & Alter 1 Doing and Asking Scenarios 





Household Income 0.0821*** 
 (0.0211) 
College Degree 0.378* 
 (0.160) 
Political Party-Democrat 0.470* 
 (0.208) 
Alter 1 Giving and Asking Scenarios  
Scenario 1: Alter Gives–Alter Asks–Ego Asks 0.606* 
   Alter Gives and Mutual Asking (0.257) 
Scenario 2: Alter Gives–Alter Asks–No Ego Ask 0.821* 
   Alter Gives and Alter Asks (0.327) 
Scenario 3: Alter Gives–No Alter Ask–Ego Asks 0.499 
   Alter Gives and Ego Asks (0.330) 
Scenario 4: Alter Gives–No Alter Ask–No Ego Ask  0.518** 
   Alter Gives and No Asking (0.188) 
Scenario 5: Non-Giving Alter–No Alter Ask–No Ego Ask 0.850 
  Non-Giving Alter, Mutual Asking (0.495) 
Scenario 6: Non-Giving Alter–Alter Asks–No Ego Ask 1.122 
  Non-Giving Alter, Alter Asks (0.699) 
Scenario 7: Non-Giving Alter–No Alter Ask–Ego Asks 0.673 
  Non-Giving Alter, Ego Asks (0.465) 
Scenario 8: Non-Giver–No Alter Ask–No Ego Ask -------- 




Source: Science of Generosity 2010 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Only significant measures shown. 
 
 
